Privacy’s First Big Hit: Australian Clinical Labs Fined $5.8 Million for Data Breach Failures
When 86 gigabytes of patient data — including health, financial and identity information — hit the dark web after a ransomware attack, the fallout was always going to be brutal.
Now, in Australian Information Commissioner v Australian Clinical Labs Limited (No 2) [2025] FCA 1224, the Federal Court has handed down a $5.8 million penalty — marking the first civil penalty judgment under the Privacy Act.
And it’s a warning shot for every business holding personal information in Australia.
⚖️ The Case in a Nutshell
Australian Clinical Labs (ACL) — one of the country’s largest private pathology providers — bought Medlab Pathology in late 2021.
What it didn’t buy (or even check properly) were Medlab’s crumbling IT systems: unsupported Windows servers, weak authentication, no encryption, and logs that deleted themselves every hour.
In February 2022, the inevitable happened — a ransomware group calling itself “Quantum” infiltrated Medlab’s servers, exfiltrated 86GB of data, and dumped it online.
ACL’s response was painfully slow. Despite early signs of exfiltration, it:
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Relied almost entirely on an external consultant’s limited review;
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Concluded (wrongly) that no data had been stolen;
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Ignored early warnings from the Australian Cyber Security Centre; and
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Waited over three months before notifying the OAIC.
🧩 The Breaches
Justice Halley found ACL had seriously interfered with the privacy of 223,000 individuals through three major contraventions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth):
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Breach of APP 11.1 — Failure to take reasonable steps to protect personal information from unauthorised access or disclosure.
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The Medlab systems were riddled with vulnerabilities.
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ACL failed to identify or patch them after acquisition.
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Overreliance on third-party providers compounded the problem.
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Breach of s 26WH(2) — Failure to carry out a reasonable and expeditious assessment of whether the incident was an eligible data breach.
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ACL’s “assessment” was based on incomplete data and unsupported assumptions.
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The Court called it unreasonable and inadequate.
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Breach of s 26WK(2) — Failure to notify the Commissioner as soon as practicable after forming the belief that an eligible data breach had occurred.
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ACL delayed nearly a month after confirmation that personal and financial information was on the dark web.
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Each breach amounted to a “serious interference with privacy” under s 13G, attracting civil penalties.
💰 The Penalty Breakdown
ACL agreed to pay a total of $5.8 million:
| Contravention | Section | Penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Breach of APP 11.1 (223,000 contraventions, treated as one course of conduct) | s 13G(a) | $4.2 million |
| Failure to assess breach | s 26WH(2) | $800,000 |
| Failure to notify OAIC | s 26WK(2) | $800,000 |
| Total | $5.8 million |
ACL also agreed to pay $400,000 in costs.
While the theoretical maximum exceeded $495 billion, the Court accepted the agreed penalty as being within the permissible range — particularly given ACL’s cooperation, remorse, and post-breach reforms.
⚙️ “Reasonable Steps” — The New Legal Standard
This judgment finally gives judicial colour to APP 11.1’s “reasonable steps” requirement.
Justice Halley said reasonableness must be assessed objectively, considering:
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the sensitivity of the information;
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the potential harm from unauthorised disclosure;
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the size and sophistication of the entity;
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the cyber risk landscape; and
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any prior threats or attacks.
Critically, “reasonable steps” cannot be outsourced — delegation to an IT vendor does not discharge responsibility. ACL’s overreliance on StickmanCyber was no defence.
🚨 Why It Matters
This decision rewrites the playbook for privacy compliance in Australia:
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Civil penalties are real — the OAIC now has judicial precedent for enforcement.
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Each affected individual counts — the Court held that each person’s privacy breach is a separate contravention.
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“Serious” breaches will be taken seriously — health and financial data, inadequate security, and systemic failures will all tip the scales.
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M&A due diligence must cover cybersecurity — buying a business means inheriting its data liabilities.
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Notification delays will cost you — the OAIC expects “as soon as practicable,” not weeks or months.
💡 IP Mojo Take
Privacy can’t be treated anymore like it is just a paperwork exercise — it’s a governance test you can fail in the Federal Court.
This case cements privacy law as a compliance discipline with teeth.
The OAIC now has a roadmap for future actions — and the Court has made clear that “reasonable steps” means measurable, auditable, and proactive security governance.
For corporate Australia, this is ASIC v RI Advice for the health sector — but under the Privacy Act instead of the Corporations Act.
Expect to see:
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Increased OAIC enforcement in healthcare, finance, and tech sectors;
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Board-level scrutiny of data protection measures; and
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Class actions waiting in the wings, armed with a judicial finding of “serious interference with privacy.”
The privacy bar has just been raised — permanently.
The Federal Court has handed down its first civil penalty judgment under the Online Safety Act 2021 (Cth), in eSafety Commissioner v Rotondo (No 4) [2025] FCA 1191.
This July marks a pivotal moment for Queensland public sector entities, agencies, and their contractors. The Information Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment (IPOLA) Act 2023 comes into full effect from 1 July 2025, ushering in sweeping updates to Queensland’s Information Privacy Act 2009, Right to Information Act 2009, and the rules governing data-breach notifications.
You could be forgiven for thinking Australia’s privacy law just had its big moment — and it did. But don’t get too comfortable. What we’ve seen so far from the December 2024 amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is just Round 1.
Automated decision-making is everywhere now — in the background of your credit check, your insurance quote, your job application, even the price you see for a pair of shoes. For a while, this opaque machine logic operated in a legal blind spot: useful, profitable, and often inscrutable. But no longer.
For many years, privacy enforcement in Australia was a bit… polite. The OAIC could nudge, issue determinations, and make a bit of noise, but it often lacked the real teeth needed to drive compliance in the boardroom. That era is over.